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## AMERICA'S PRE-PROGRAMMED POLICY

THERE is little room for speculation about the objective or the likely tactics of Warren Christopher when he comes on his projected visit, or series of visits, to Israel and the Arab states.

When Christopher became secretary of state, it was admitted that he knew very little about the origins and facts of the dispute. He was even taken by surprise by the looming geography of the Golan Heights. But then, why bother with origins, facts, nagging questions, when you have the answers and solutions ready-made in the files of the State Department? There Christopher has discovered the clear-cut guidelines for overall strategy, for day-to-day tactics - and the annals of the track record of his predecessors.

The angle of approach of each new American practitioner in the field must necessarily change, but the desired end result is always the same. Let us recall a few examples from one period of our recent history: the Yom Kippur War, its prologue and its aftermath. In the prologue, we had Israel's so-called War of Attrition with Egypt, fought out in the Suez Canal zone.

US intervention brought about a cease-fire. Israel made it a condition that the cease-fire must be accompanied by a "standstill" - that is, that no arms should be moved from their positions. Israel's special reason was the presence in Egypt, 30 kilometers from the Canal, of the Soviets' up-to-date SAM 6 missiles, to which Israel had no response.

Stationed on the Canal, they could have a devastating effect on the Israeli Air Force. The Egyptians, with Soviet approval, accepted the condition. That night, 12 hours after signing the agreement, they violated it, bringing the SAMs down to the Canal.

Israel protested to Washington, and was met by the astonishing reply that American Intelligence was unaware of any such movement of missiles. For three weeks, Washington maintained this fiction. When it finally admitted the truth, it refused to press the Egyptians and the Soviets to withdraw the missiles.

One great American, Senator Henry Jackson, was up in arms. He urged vehemently that the US administration act for the removal of the missiles. If hostilities were renewed, he said, "the Israeli Air Force would pay a high price in lives and aircraft in attempting to destroy the SAM defense system." Nobody could doubt that but Washington had its own agenda. Americans believe that we will succeed in this war and gain a victory, because this is important to them," he said (Ha'aretz, October 21, 1973).

Jerusalem, however, had still to be persuaded. Fifteen months after the event, Gen. Moshe Dayan, who had been defense minister, described Kissinger's next step: "The US moved in and denied us the fruits of victory.

It was an ultimatum