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## DEALING WITH THE SIX DAY WAR

Public warned to drop the notion  
“occupation” descended on peaceful Arabs

HERE IS A simple test – a kind of litmus test – to uncover the tactical gimmick of those Israelis, and others, who go on insisting that Israel must give up territory, specifically Judea and Samaria, and that this will bring peace. Watch how they deal with the Six Day War or, more precisely, how they do not deal, with the Six Day War.

Their attitude is usually grounded in the notion that one day in June 1967 an “Israeli occupation” suddenly descended on peaceful Arabs and their lawful king in their lawful territory; and the way to restore peace is naturally by restoring the “occupied territory.”

Sometimes this tactic creeps, merely incidentally, merely “by the way,” even subliminally, into otherwise innocent presentations. An article in *The Jerusalem Post* last week (*Too soon to write off Jordan*, April 18), dealt with the birth and history of Jordan, and the ideas of its king on the future of Judea and Samaria: that is to say, by which Arabs it is to be ruled when Israel withdraws.

The article has several references to the 1967 war. One says that “the loss of the West Bank in the Six Day War did not prevent violent conflict between Hussein and the Palestinians.” Another relates that “after 1967 Hussein realized he would not be able to restore the previous situation, hence his 1972 suggestion for a federation between the two banks.” A third mention tells us that the agreement (in February 1985) between Hussein and Arafat provided for “total withdrawal by Israel from the territories occupied in 1967.”

None of these statements is untrue: but an innocent reader unacquainted with the history, putting these references together, would never guess that Hussein “lost” Judea and Samaria because he tried to overrun the rest of western Palestine – that is, to wipe the State of Israel off the map.

IF YOU IGNORE the cause and the context of the Six Day War, and flourish the “Israeli occupation” as the cause and the beginning of the dispute, all you need in order to restore the peace is to put an end to the “occupation.” Q.E.D.

This code-formula is common to all the advocates of surrender to Arab demands – from the least sophisticated to the most subtle among them. They do not, manifestly they cannot, answer coherently the crucial questions that stare out from the events that preceded the Six Day War.

For example: Knowing that Israel was attacked with the proclaimed purpose of her annihilation when she was in possession of the area within the 1949 Armistice lines, how can you justify the demand that she return to those lines? Or: Knowing that an attenuated, vulnerable Israel was twice attacked from the east – by Abdullah in 1948 and by grandson Hussein in 1967 – and that Hussein has never expressed regret for either attack, has indeed described them (true to the Arab-Moslem doctrine) as *Zionist aggressions* – have you any demonstrable grounds for believing that were Israel to be reduced to the 1949 lines, Hussein or any other Arab leader would resist the temptation to

plan a final offensive; or that, with Israel so invitingly reduced, the Arab states as a whole would not, in concert with Jordan, organize and launch that attack? Can you explain why Egypt, having been given all of Sinai, insisted on a clause in the peace treaty which would legitimize her joining other Arab states in a future attack on Israel?

HERE IS A characteristic description of Israel and her neighbours:

“Day after day, the Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian armies listen to the hostile incitements and calls for war of their commanders and rulers. We are subjected almost every day to guerrilla war conducted against us by some of our neighbours, especially Egypt and Jordan.”

And, amid a flood of Arab leaders’ threatening declarations, King Hussein of Jordan sent a telegram to the Egyptian President: “We look forward to the future when the Arab flag will fly over our great stolen country.”

“Stolen country”? Judea and Samaria? No, no. The date was July 28, 1956. The “stolen country” was Israel within the 1949 Armistice lines. The description of what the Arabs were doing was by then prime minister Ben-Gurion.

If Israel were to be stupid enough as to withdraw as demanded, and retain only the tiny “stolen” territory as before 1967 – how long would it be before Hussein and Mubarak and Assad and Arafat and company, in the name of the Arab nation would launch a new and “final” version of their attempts in 1948 and 1967? How long indeed – a year, two years, three years?

SCORES OF times before 1967, Israel’s condition was faithfully described in similar terms by Ben-Gurion. In 1963, for example, he stated it succinctly: “Israel is the only country in the world all of whose neighbours proclaim night and day that they are determined to destroy it.” Sometimes it was depicted in even more eloquent terms, by Abba Eban, for years Israel’s leading foreign affairs spokesman. He said simply that the pre-1967 lines were a “death-trap” (*The Jerusalem Post*, 19 June, 1967).

Today, Abba Eban is not the least important of the purveyors of the idea that the solution of Israel’s security problem lies in her surrender of territory, even unto a stages withdrawal into the “death-trap.” It must be recalled at once in his defence that it was he, as foreign minister in the horrible days preceding the Six Day War, who went cap-in-hand to the Western statesmen to remind them of their earlier pledge to come to Israel’s support; he whom those frozen-faced statesmen sent back empty-handed, leaving Israel to her fate. (He was foreign minister also in 1973 when the Western statesmen, even more frozen-faced, denied access to their soil by American planes carrying supplies to a hard-pressed Israel.)

There are some then who will not begrudge him the present sunny smiles and warm welcome from those Western statesmen when he tells them of a willingness in Israel to return to that condition of pristine vulnerability which they are constantly urging upon Israel.

In a recent, characteristic article (Verbal Roadblocks, *The Jerusalem Post*, March 21, 1986), dealing with the pitfalls of semantics, Eban begins the setting of his argument with: “Immediately after the Six Day War I proposed the acceptance of a simple formula under which a mediator would be appointed for a peaceful settlement.”

How calm, how self-possessed, how irrelevant, how forgetful of the ferocious semantics of May 1967, the proclamations by all the Arab leaders of the imminent end of Israel and its people, of the exhilarant crowds in the streets of the Arab capitals welcoming their leaders' declared purpose. Forgetful Mr. Eban (indeed, the same Eban) himself, in his speech at the United Nations shudderingly described that purpose in the dread word "the final solution."

Now he sweeps that "final solution" under the carpet – and no Arab leader has given up that hope – and declares that "the very act of encounter (between Israel and the Arabs) unfreezes positions and creates unforeseen flexibilities." He knows there will be no unfreezing, no flexibility on the Arab side, that nothing except total compliance by Israel will be acceptable to the Arabs.

HE KNOWS IT from our common experience. Egypt signed a peace treaty after being offered one hundred per cent of her territorial demands and only after, at her insistence, a clause was inserted to legitimize her going to war again against Israel in company with other Arab states. As for Hussein, Eban knows that the only substantive difference between him and Arafat is over the question which of them will rule over Judea and Samaria once Israel has withdrawn from all the "occupied territory."

Nor is that all. Hussein has long known that in any negotiation as envisaged by Eban and his school, he will encounter a massive instant one-sided "flexibility" from Israel. Mr. Eban long ago confessed that (following Hussein's rejection of the Allon Plan) at least some of the Labour Party leaders would offer Hussein 71 per cent of the territory as proposed in the Allon Plan but without a full contractual peace treaty. They would agree to a "de facto" peace (such as exists now . . .) pending a full peace – pending, that is, "negotiation" over the remaining 29 per cent (Abba Eban in a *Ha'ir* interview, September 23, 1983).

The Eban school does not appear to suspect that what they are juggling with is the heart of their national homeland. On the contrary, he himself has said that his party always regarded Judea and Samaria as "bargaining counters."

All in all, it need surprise nobody that these ideologists whose memories begin with June 12, 1967 are consistently vociferating (lest the rest of us forget) "We are *sane*. We are *sane*."