


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WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.

# FIRING LINE

GUESTS: SHLOMO AVINERI, SAMUEL KATZ

SUBJECT: #362 "PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?"

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SECA PRESENTS

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FIRING LINE is produced and directed by  
WARREN STEIBEL.

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MR. BUCKLEY: The last three programs from Tel Aviv have covered almost every point of view of current interest with a single exception, and that is the opposition to the proposed treaty. It was only three days ago, local time, that President Carter departed from Jerusalem, and we are here in continuing ignorance of some of the fine print in that treaty. But one of our guests has announced his opposition to the treaty as a whole, and the second of our guests, who appeared on this program four years ago, pronounced some warnings at that time which may be worth reconsidering.

Samuel Katz was born in Johannesburg in 1914 and came to Israel when he was 25 years old, serving as secretary to the counsel to Palestine. During the war years he was in London editing the Jewish Standard and writing also for the Daily Express. He came back to Israel as an activist in the underground Irgun, where he served under Menachem Begin. Together they were elected as members of the first Knesset. He became a leader of what is known as the Land of Israel movement and served as an advisor to Prime Minister Begin until they broke over political differences. Mr. Katz is the author of Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine.

Professor Shlomo Avineri is professor of political science at Hebrew University, where he has also served as dean of the faculty. He was born in Poland, coming to Israel in 1939 and studying at the London School of Economics. He has lectured and taught widely, including at Yale, Wesleyan, at the Australian National University. He has a current affiliation with Cornell University. His principal work is on the social and political theory of Karl Marx, whose early writings he has translated into Hebrew. Professor Avineri's article in Foreign Affairs of last fall caused considerable comment.

I should like to begin by asking Mr. Katz to identify that provision in the treaty to which he principally objects.

MR. KATZ: Well, as you said earlier, I don't object to any particular provision of the treaty. I object to the treaty as a whole, because I don't believe that this treaty will bring peace. I believe it's a prescription for an earlier war than we might otherwise expect.

MR. BUCKLEY: Why do you say that?

MR. KATZ: Because I do not believe that the Egyptians, any more than the other Arab states, have given up their doctrine of annihilation of the Jewish state. I have not seen any evidence that can be regarded seriously from President Sadat to suggest that he has given up that intention. On the contrary, it may be remembered that when Mr. Begin went to Washington on his last visit, he announced when he left, or when he arrived at the airport that the suggestions, the proposals made by President Sadat would make a sham of the treaty and would in fact be a treaty for war and not for peace. Now in first place, nothing, as far as we know, has changed fundamentally in President Sadat's terms. And we know that he has repeatedly said, also outside of the context of the treaty, that Egypt cannot and will not go back on her obligations to the other Arab states if Israel attacks one of them and they call on her to help them. Well, this is something that has been repeated almost day after day since November in the Egyptian press, by other members of the Egyptian government, and it has included--these statements have included--



a direct reference by President Sadat in November to the obligation undertaken by all the Arab states in Rabat, Morocco in 1974 to, first of all recognize the Palestinian--the PLO--as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and also to come to the aid of the PLO whenever called upon. He did this at a time when he was supposed to be negotiating a peace treaty, and it's clear that his intention was not only to announce to the Arab world, but to warn, or to make plain to Israel and to the United States that after the peace had been established, after Israel had made the various--had consummated the various withdrawals and retreats, that Egypt would then be as free to make war on her as she had been before the treaty was signed.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, Mr. Katz, let me remind Professor Avineri of something he said four years ago, because I would like to bounce off it in analyzing your statement or attempting to. You said, "If I read the Arab policy correctly, their refusal to accept a Jewish body politic in the Middle East is almost absolute." Did you read them correctly?

MR. AVINERI: I think I read them correctly at that time, and the great breakthrough of Sadat's visit is that it was the first time that an Arab leader publicly and clearly and unequivocally changed his views about that issue. And this is the great importance of Sadat's visit, and this is where I would disagree with Mr. Katz. There has been a shift in the position of one Arab country--Egypt. Until Sadat's visit to Jerusalem a year and a half ago, all Arab countries and all Arab leaders, be they quote "moderate" or "extremist" were united on one platform: that they do not accept the existence of a body--of Jewish--body politic in the Middle East. And when Sadat came to Jerusalem and addressed the Israeli Knesset, the Israeli parliament, on an official state visit, when he stood to attention when the Israeli national anthem was played at Lod Airport, and when he said to the sovereign political representative body of the Israeli public, the Knesset, "I am here to tell you that for 30 years we have not accepted you as part of the Middle East, we were not ready to live in peace with you. And here I am to tell you that we are now ready to live in peace with you and to accept you," this was the great breakthrough. I confess that, practically with everybody else in this world, four years ago, I did not think this would be possible and such a quantum jump would occur. It did occur. It didn't solve all the problems, and here I think--

MR. BUCKLEY: But it was not a Trojan horse as Mr. Katz thinks it was.

MR. AVINERI: I don't think it is a Trojan horse. You never know anything about Trojan horses unless those people come out and then start attacking you. I have to take Sadat seriously at his word for a very simple reason. First of all, I think I took him seriously when he said he was not accepting Israel. I think at that time, when I made that statement, there were a lot of people who said, "No, this is just verbiage. It doesn't really mean anything." It meant a lot when the Egyptians weren't ready to accept Israel. It means a lot now when they have changed their minds. And Sadat has also gone out on a limb and taken tremendous political risks by doing that. Sadat's step is not a sham step. He has alienated himself from practically the whole Arab world. The PLO has more or less

put a contract on his life, and we don't yet know what the extremists in the Arab world--which includes such people as Libya's Qaddafi, the Iraqis, and the South Yemenese--are yet going to do. Now the fact that somebody alienates himself so much, the fact that he has been under constant attack for the last year and a half for his trip to Jerusalem signifies, at least to me, that his Arab brethren think that what he is doing is meaningful. If it had been just a sham trick, it wouldn't have worked out like that.

MR. BUCKLEY: Nor would he have had the relationship with his people that he quite manifestly enjoys, correct?

MR. AVINERI: And obviously he is very much in control of Egypt. Egypt certainly is not a representative democracy, but it is a country which, for reasons that go very deep into the history of Egypt, whoever was leading Egypt in the last 30 years has had great support among the populus. If you compare Egypt to other Arab countries, like Syria or Iraq, where there have been revolutions, revolts, coup d'etats, military insurrections, Egypt is a very stable country. Things can change, but again, how do we know? How can we assess a system? We can assess it only by its past performance. And both Nasser and Sadat who are very different political animals, both of them have gone through thick and thin and have maintained control over the country. Nasser had many setbacks and he maintained control, while in other Arab countries with comparable setbacks, whoever was at the head of the government usually was kicked out in a coup d'etat. And the same applies to Sadat. If you look at Sadat, first of all he survived the succession to Nasser, which wasn't very easy. He survived his kicking out the Soviet advisors. He survived going to war against Israel, which meant taking tremendous risks, and he also survived the very complex outcome to Egypt of that war. He survived his peace initiative last November, he survived the fact that it was hanging up in the air for a whole year while he was isolated and under attack from the Arab countries, and he has survived some concessions which he has made to Israel. I think Israel has made many more concessions than Egypt has made, but the very fact that he was able to survive that gives me some sort of indication about both his seriousness, his sincerity, as well as the political support which he seems to have in Egypt.

MR. BUCKLEY: How do you cope with that, Mr. Katz?

MR. KATZ: Well, there are a good many things to be said about that. First of all, if I may make an introduction on one or two of the points made by Professor Avineri--the expulsion of the Soviet agents or advisors in 1972 was a complete bluff. Mr. Sadat has himself boasted about it. It has been published in a book under his sponsorship a year or two after the Yom Kippur War. He kicked out the Soviet advisors and then promptly was in cahoots with the Soviets for the next year and a half to prepare the Yom Kippur War. He has himself called this a splendid piece of camouflage. This is just by the way--

MR. BUCKLEY: Is this disputed by you?

MR. AVINERI: I think it can be very disputed because-- I don't

want to go into the details about the evidence--the expulsion of the Soviet advisors from Egypt was, from Sadat's point of view, a clear decision that he was going to go to war, because the Soviets weren't really interested in Sadat's going to war, because they were aware of some of the possible consequences, but--

MR. BUCKLEY: But Mr. Katz is, of course, correct, that the Soviet Union didn't for that reason cease to keep Egypt supplied with raw material?

MR. AVINERI: One can again argue about it. What I am again saying is that the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt was very abrupt, which shocked the Soviets very much--and we know that from western intelligence sources as well--and was a turnabout of Egyptian policies.

MR. BUCKLEY: Now you're saying it was not collusive, but Mr. Katz is saying it was collusive.

MR. AVINERI: What I'm saying is that Sadat, while kicking the Soviets out and opening himself to the West, which has been his move all the way along, never gave up the Soviet option. He would have been a fool if he had given that up.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. Proceed, Mr. Katz.

MR. KATZ: I don't want to take that any further. In my opinion the evidence is quite conclusive if Mr. Sadat has been prepared to publish this in more than one place. And I consequently say that Mr. Sadat, who I think is a very brilliant man, may well be playing a part now as well. I am not prepared to accept as very good currency the complete rift between President Sadat and the Arab world. Professor Avineri has pointed to the tremendous survivability of Sadat, and I think this may well suggest that the threat to Sadat and the dangers he has had to face are much less acute than we imagine.

MR. AVINERI: But some of his advisors have been murdered by the PLO in Cyprus, like Sibai, for example.

MR. KATZ: But there was a special reason for that.

MR. AVINERI: Of course.

MR. KATZ: I am not prepared to swear one way or the other. Now as to his intentions, I myself believed at first that maybe Sadat had really come to the conclusion that he had better make peace with Israel because he is under such economic pressure in his own country. He has terrible problems there, both at large and especially the urban problems of the city of Cairo, which is a central element in the makeup of the country. I believed that for as long as I believed that the initiative had been Sadat's in the whole peace process. But it wasn't. This is another one of the unfathomable mysteries of Israeli information policy. The initiative began not with Mr. Sadat. It began with Mr. Begin. When Sadat came to Jerusalem, he had Sinai in his pocket. He had been already offered Sinai two months earlier--or had been told that he could have Sinai, with whatever reservations there were at the

time. And this brought about his coming to Jerusalem. He himself has said publicly--or at that time he said--that the idea of coming to Jerusalem had come to him on a plane trip between Bucharest and Tehran. He had been on a visit to President Ceausescu of Romania some days after Mr. Begin had been on a visit to Mr. Ceausescu, and Ceausescu had advised him to talk to Mr. Begin. Well, after 30 years of such hostility, for a Romanian president casually to say, "You should see Mr. Begin," this is fantastic, unless he told him something much more substantial.

MR. AVINERI: You really seem to believe all of Sadat's anecdotes.

MR. KATZ: It fits in with the facts. I believe--

MR. AVINERI: It fits in with the theory behind the facts.

MR. KATZ: No, no, I didn't, as I said, I didn't know this at all. I believed myself that possibly there was a chance. When I learnt this subsequently--

MR. BUCKLEY: Were you at that point still with Mr. Begin?

MR. KATZ: When Sadat visited Jerusalem, I was still there. But there were other reasons for the break, because the plan put forward by Mr. Begin, after that total plan, I regarded, as opening the door on one hand to ultimate war and as making certain that in one or two or three steps we would lose Judea and Samaria and they would go under Arab control. In fact what happened subsequently I think rather bears out my fears of that time. Now as far as the intentions of Sadat are concerned, I believe what he says. You can't ignore the fact that when you've had a peace process or negotiations going on for a whole year, that just as you're about to sign the treaty, one side says, "I'm not signing unless I am given the right to go to war," and then say you don't take it seriously.

MR. AVINERI: May I interrupt you?

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, I would like your comment on that.

MR. AVINERI: I think this is a misrepresentation of the facts. The Israeli delegation at Camp David, as you remember, did not bring up the issue of the special status of the Israeli/Egyptian treaty. We didn't bring it up at Camp David because--

MR. BUCKLEY: It was just neglect, right?

MR. AVINERI: It was either neglect or--I'm not privy to the counsel of the government now--so either it was neglect or some people in the government didn't really think it was that important. When we brought it up later, it really meant asking the Egyptians to do something which would be equivalent to an American president telling the Soviets, "First of all you have to abrogate the Communist Manifesto before we have any sort of trade agreement with you." Now it stands to reason--I can give you all the arguments which I am sure Mr. Katz would give you--that you can't trust the Soviets. I mean, how can you trust them? They still teach the Communist Manifesto in schools. They still tell you as Khrushchev



did, "We will bury you," and I'm sure they believe in it. But the question is, do we deal here with trying to convert the Egyptians into Zionists? I mean, is it conceivable that we will make all the Egyptians sign the Zionist charter and join the Zionist organizations? God knows what we're going to do with them then. But can we really do that? Or do we expect Egyptians or any other Arab country or leader ready to move towards peace to give us some signal, some sign, that they are ready to change their policies? Now we have said, and you quoted me on that before, that no Arab country has ever accepted Israel. Here we have an Arab leader saying he's ready to sign a peace treaty with Israel even if no other Arab country really goes along with him. He has territorial demands and they are tough, and they are not easy for Israel to accept. He has also demands on the Palestinian issue and they aren't either very easy for Israel to accept. He is ready, after one step of the peace treaty will be carried out, to have full diplomatic relations with Israel. Now this is after all the scenario for which we have been hoping. Now this doesn't mean that after an Egyptian leader says that or goes through the motions of doing that that I'm ready to disarm Israel or that I'm ready to say that we're going to have no kind of countervailing power vis-a-vis Egypt, that we're not in need of further security guarantees--we are. And for this reason we are taking some steps--and this is a government with which I am not in sympathy. It is Mr. Katz's party which is in power, not the party which I support and think that should be--

MR. KATZ: You have gone a long way in this interruption, Professor Avineri. (laughter)

MR. AVINERI: Now that you have interrupted me, let me just finish and say--

MR. KATZ: You mean I shouldn't interrupt you? (laughter)

MR. AVINERI: No, no, just let me finish the sentence. We deal here with a situation where you have to take risks. And the real question for Israel is, did we take in this peace treaty--

MR. BUCKLEY: A reasonable risk.

MR. AVINERI: --a reasonable risk or an unreasonable one. And I think Mr. Katz thinks that we took an unreasonable risk and I believe--and I happen to agree with the government--that we took a reasonable risk.

MR. KATZ: May I go back to the fact which Professor Avineri suggested was a misrepresentation. He has forgotten the text of the treaty. This whole discussion, and the breakdown of negotiations, was not over what had been written at Camp David. It was about article six in the treaty, which Egypt was supposed to have agreed to, and whereby Egypt was supposed to regard this treaty as--

MR. BUCKLEY: Paramount.

MR. KATZ: --superceding. Because it's not a question of a trade treaty with the Soviet Union. It's a question that affects our

existence. In a trade treaty with the Soviet Union, I can believe them or not. I am not going to suffer the threat of extinction as a result. This said in effect that Egypt was making peace with us and with every intention of maintaining it. It was then that President Sadat introduced his requirement that there should be a change in the text which had already been agreed on in order to enable him to maintain what he described as his obligation of solidarity with the other Arab states. But I am concerned much more with the statements that he made at that time outside of the negotiations in various television interviews with European stations or in speeches in Egypt itself, or by some of his spokesmen. His foreign minister, or the acting foreign minister, Ghali, spoke to foreign correspondents in Cairo on the 22nd of December. He was apparently asked--I didn't see the question; I saw only the answer--he was apparently asked, "Give us an idea of what kind of circumstances Egypt would regard as compelling her to go to the aid of an Arab state." And Ghali said, "For example, Egypt's intervention in the War of 1948." Now, as Professor Avineri very well knows, the War of 1948 was the war in which they tried to prevent Israel's birth, or when they didn't succeed in that, to choke it at birth--where there was no possible question of Israel carrying out any active aggression, where it was proclaimed by the Arab states at the time, by the secretary-general of the Arab League, that this invasion would be remembered in history as similar to the massacre and slaughter of the Mongols and the Crusaders. So when an erudite Egyptian who knows history tells me that his model is going to be that war--and that war was not in the whole of western Palestine, it was in the partition state without Judea, without Samaria, without even Western Galilee or Ramle or Lod--this is regarded by them as the model on which they would be prepared or find themselves compelled to go to war on Israel. When I add to that the reiterated--and what we would regard, as rational people--the untimely reiteration of support for the PLO, which is committed openly and uninhibitedly to the destruction of Israel, am I not to take that seriously? Am I to compare this with a treaty of trade with the Soviet Union? To say I don't trust them when I do?

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, let me ask Mr. Avineri whether he considers as irreconcilable a commitment by Egypt to recognize the integrity of Israel and a relationship with a body whose stated goal is the destruction of Israel? How do you handle that paradox?

MR. AVINERI: I think the Egyptians, as well as we--and this is part of the negotiating process--want to have it both ways. There's no doubt that the Egyptians want to have it both ways. But let us remind ourselves--and here I have really to argue with the position presented by Mr. Katz, and previously also presented by the prime minister--what has really happened in Israel and what has made possible the signature of the peace treaty is the fact that Mr. Begin has changed his mind. In Israel since 1967 there has been a debate going on--a very complex debate with many national and ideological and even religious overtones, which can be roughly called the debate between the doves and the hawks. And the main issue of the debate was that the doves have said that if and when an Arab country or Arab countries will be ready for peace, we will be able to achieve peace only, more or less, along 1967 boundaries;

whereas the hawks have thought, and I think Mr. Katz still thinks that there can be a scenario in which Israel will get peace from the Arab countries and still maintain much of the territories which have come under our jurisdiction since 1967. And until Mr. Begin became prime minister, he also always said that we will have peace with the Arabs and we will be able to keep Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as part of the state of Israel because they are historical parts of the land of Israel.

MR. KATZ: May I make a brief interruption here about the doves? The doves did not say they were prepared to go back to '67 lines. On the contrary it was the universal opinion among them that we couldn't go back to '67 lines.

MR. AVINERI: No, I said that the doves generally said that if and when there would be peace, it will not be achievable from the Israeli point of view unless we go back more or less to '67 boundaries. I define the '67 boundaries as an indication, not as a holy line of any sort whatsoever.

MR. BUCKLEY: Resolution 242 was acceded to by Israel.

MR. AVINERI: It was acceded, which-- I mean, it didn't say all the territories, it said the territories--

MR. KATZ: And the Allon Plan?

MR. AVINERI: The Allon Plan--again it means more or less. It doesn't mean that we will maintain and we can--you see, we can again argue about the past-- What has now been clear is, the only scenario under which Israel can get peace is by practically giving up not all the territories, but most of the territories. And Mr. Begin thought differently when he went into the negotiating process. He thought, and he said it publicly, and Mr. Katz was at that time still his advisor, "We will get peace and we will maintain our control over Judea, Samaria and the West Bank, let alone the Golan Heights and certainly parts of Sinai. Now it becomes very clear that the process under which we are now negotiating and signing an agreement with Egypt is a process which eventually will take the West Bank and Gaza out from under Israeli control. And this does not mean--and here I come back to your initial question--that we have to accept that the alternative to an Israeli rule on the West Bank and Gaza has to be the PLO rule as perhaps the Egyptians seem to say or even think at that moment. It will be the test of Israeli statesmanship in the next years whether we will be able to find a formula that will insure Israel's security needs on the West Bank because we have security needs on the West Bank. Because the West Bank, if it will be an arsenal for an Arab army, and especially for a PLO army, it will be a springboard for the destruction of Israel, or can be a springboard for the destruction of Israel. So we have to balance Israel's security needs on the West Bank with the fact that there are a million Palestinian Arabs who are living there and who don't want and who shouldn't be under Israeli rule. Just two years ago whenever anybody mentioned in English or Hebrew to the prime minister the word Palestinian, he was called by the prime minister and by the Likud Party more or less a traitor to the Zionist cause. Now the prime minister

is talking about the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-government, autonomy. Eventually this will lead, not necessarily as I hope, to an independent state on the West Bank, but to the withdrawal of Israeli control on the West Bank. And the question is, and this is now the key question--

MR. BUCKLEY: What will be the residual situation?

MR. AVINERI: What will be the residual situation. Can we bring in the one relatively moderate Arab leader, who has some standing in the West Bank--I'm saying some standing--who has some sort of historical claim--again, I'm saying some sort of historical claim. Because what we deal here with this conflict is that both sides have very good arguments. I subscribe to practically all of the arguments that Mr. Katz has said, but the only point is that the other side has also some--to them--valid arguments, and we have to find a way in which we would overcome this lack of trust. And I think part of our discussion really is not part of the solution but part of the problem. After 30 years of war--

MR. BUCKLEY: Right. A point that you stressed in your article in Foreign Affairs.

MR. AVINERI: We have this lack of trust and we have to overcome it.

MR. BUCKLEY: Without intending to be too literal on the matter of article six, do you read it as Mr. Katz does--i.e., as acknowledging an antecedent and paramount commitment by Egypt to join any other Arab state in any military enterprise aimed at Israel?

MR. AVINERI: Let me tell you--I think article six, which was our concoction, is completely irrelevant and I could do without it.

MR. BUCKLEY: Is it because there's no hypothesis in which it becomes--

MR. AVINERI: No, because what is the point of article six as Mr. Katz would have liked to see it? You don't trust the Egyptians surely. I don't trust them. They don't trust us.

MR. KATZ: I do.

MR. AVINERI: I don't trust them when they sign a document because I know situations can change and they don't trust us. What will create trust between them and us is not a document and not a legal article, but the real situation of cooperation--

MR. BUCKLEY: --a productive relationship.

MR. AVINERI: Yes. If I don't trust the Egyptians because they may attack us--which I think is not out of the question in situations like this; it may come--will I trust them just because they have signed an article which says they'll never do that? This reminds me of the situation which was prevalent in the United States in the fifties when any alien entering the United States had to sign a long list of subversive organizations, communist organizations of which he had to declare that he was never a member, and it was also said



that he had to sign that he was not coming to the United States in order to subvert the constitutional government of the United States. I mean, a communist agent would have no problem with signing that document. The only--

MR. BUCKLEY: The purpose of that document was to create an act of perjury which would be then a deportable offense.

MR. AVINERI: Yes, I realize that and I realize that you may be unhappy about me bringing it up in this way (laughter) but what I'm saying is, whatever its internal function was--and there is an internal function to what Mr. Katz says as well--in terms of the legality of the issue--

MR. BUCKLEY: It's a formalism.

MR. AVINERI: It's a formalism. It wouldn't stop any communist agent infiltrating the United States in order to subvert its constitutionally elected government. The only people who were likely to be afraid of that article were people who thought that perhaps 55 years ago they might have joined an organization which was slightly suspect. Now the same applies here. To me, the test of the treaty will not be in what is written in the text. I may perhaps say that if the treaty works out and there is going to be peace between Israel and Egypt and the peace will last, as I hope it will, after ten years, practically nobody will ever remember what the text of the treaty said. The reality will supercede whatever ambiguities and equivocations are in the treaty--and the treaty is full of holes. And it has to be. If on the other hand, war will break out again, as I hope it won't, but if it will, it won't break out because of an article or because of a paragraph, but because of a situation which will change or because somebody changed his mind or somebody made a terrible mistake.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, well, Mr. Katz, would you find reassuring if after the consummation of the treaty--and I guess we all assume it will have been consummated by the time this program is aired--would you find it reassuring if Egypt embarked on a substantial and convincing program of disarmament?

MR. KATZ: Well, this is a very hypothetical question indeed because she doesn't intend to do that in the least. Why should I imagine things that are not going to happen? As a matter of fact, Egypt is in the process of asking the United States for tremendous additions to her rearmament program--to her armament program.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, but subject to very rigid American controls as to how they can be used.

MR. KATZ: If we are talking about Egyptian intentions, I have got to examine what they think and not what Washington may or may not do. I want to add a few things to what I was saying before on this question of Sadat's purpose. See, I myself said I don't think that the question is primarily one of an article in an agreement. I am looking at what is being said in the periphery of the agreement by Egyptian spokesmen. To that I notice Professor

Avineri didn't address himself at all. Now to say that there is a kind of consensus or was a kind of consensus among the doves in this country to an arrangement whereby we would more or less give up everything except the 1967 territory is, I think, a misrepresentation of the facts, to quote Professor Avineri. As a matter of fact, even the dovish alignment government, after I presume years of consideration, decided that the minimum requirements of our security required our setting up or building these three major airfields, our retaining a consecutive stretch of territory between the sea and the--between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, our building of a substantial and very sophisticated naval base at Sharm el Sheikh and the establishment of these settlements, these much-disputed settlements. That was then regarded as the ultimate--

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, but that was under the assumption of hostile surroundings.

MR. KATZ: No, no, this was on the assumption of our reaching a peace agreement. Because until that time we were holding the whole of Sinai. They were not laying down regulations for a situation where there would be hostility. They were laying down conditions for a peace which we could accept, because it would be much too late to wait for hostilities after you've given up the airfields. No, that is not so. You have, for example, statements by Mr. Abba Eban, who was probably just as accommodating and as moderate and as dovish as Professor Avineri himself, who described the '67 lines as a death trap. He described them as the Auschwitz line--

MR. AVINERI: May I just say a word?

MR. KATZ: Let me just finish. Now the fact that Mr. Begin has changed his mind doesn't mean that he's right. That's not an argument that I can accept as valid. I think he's wrong. He changed his mind under whatever pressures there were. I don't think that is exactly relevant to the question. The question is a. do the Egyptians mean to give us peace or don't they? And then there is a second question which relates to your original question to me, and that is why I think the agreement is bad. Because even in Sinai precisely because we have given up what are our minimal security requirements, and precisely because in the same period Saudi Arabi is arming very expansively, well beyond her own capacity. She can't use all those arms. And because we have a buildup to our east now, which wasn't there to the same extent as before--Syria, Iraq and presumably Jordan as well--our handing over of the airfields and perhaps no less our giving up the naval base at Sharm el Sheikh, which is irreplaceable. We have no other place that we could have it southward--at Elat you could only have a much inferior base--means to me that we are endangering our security even if Sadat personally wanted peace. A country does not lay down its security doctrine because the man next door happens to want or not to want peace.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, the arguments presented in behalf of the treaty are that the net situation is an improvement and I take it that it is on those grounds that Mr. Avineri backs the treaty. But you



had some factual objection you wanted to enter on the matter of this military line.

MR. AVINERI: No, I just wanted to mention, to refer to a quotation Mr. Katz made from Mr. Eban, and earlier from the Egyptian acting foreign secretary--I think that is really one of the possible methodological mistakes if I may say so. In the process of presenting one's country's case, a foreign minister, a public official says a lot of things. And I remember exactly in what context Abba Eban said what he said about the '67 lines. And therefore this is not always the considered last political posture of your government.

MR. BUCKLEY: Diplomatic accretions.

MR. AVINERI: It's rhetoric. Can't you see that you can quote from Israeli statesmen in the last four or five weeks a lot of things which can be now used by the Egyptians to show that the Israelis don't really mean to carry out the treaty. I am sure that an opposite number to Mr. Katz is sitting in Cairo, possibly in Baghdad--in Cairo it's very difficult to speak up against the treaty, but possibly in Baghdad--and having all those lists which are very, very impressive of very tough Israeli statesmen. The question really is, what is our security? I think here since '67 we have had an optical illusion. I know what I am going to say is going to hurt a lot of Israelis and a lot of Jews and a lot of friends of Israel, but I have to say it. The best defense border Israel has ever had was the 1967 defense border. That doesn't mean that it can today be the same border, because things have changed. But let's not be so hooked up on territory to think that the '67 lines were that bad. With the terrible lines of 1967, absurd as they were--I know all the arguments against those lines--we have won our greatest victory in any Israeli/Arab war. It was the most extensive line when we were sitting up on the Golan.

MR. BUCKLEY: You nearly lost.

MR. AVINERI: And we were on the Suez Canal really in great jeopardy. Now the argument, of course, could be made, suppose the Yom Kippur War had started on the 1967 lines--where would we be? Sure. A possible answer would have been, perhaps if it had been in 1973, in 1967 lines, which means in a peace situation there would not have been a war of 1973. Because the war of 1973 had something to do with our possession of Sinai, the West Bank, and Golan. I'm not saying that I'm sure what the answer is. What we now have is, if we bring in another ingredient to our security--security is not only the extent of the territory under your control, security is not only the type of weaponry that you have, security also means who is your neighbor and how does your neighbor view you? And if we are to have now a neighbor who appears now to take some risks at coming to an accommodation with us, is ready to go through the accepted political and diplomatic motions of rapprochement which should take some years, then therefore I am happy that the agreement will be stretched out over a period of at least three years. Personally I would have been happier if it had been five or seven years--not because I want to hold on to more grains of sand in Sinai for a longer period of time, but because we deal here with

a process and it has to be tested. It has to be tested in terms of the survivability of the regime in Egypt. It has to be tested in terms of the other changes in the Middle East. Iran is one change--God knows what happens next. And therefore the longer this interim period goes on, the surer you can be that when we eventually will pull back to the international boundary with Egypt in three or three and a half years, that we deal with a relatively stable situation. And let me again say I am supporting the treaty not because I think it solves everything, not because I think that the risks which Mr. Katz has brought up are completely without foundation. I would agree with much of what he said, but I think that despite of that, we have to take a certain risk and it should be remembered that Israel is taking tremendous risks. Israel is not doing the obvious thing. Israel is taking risks.

MR. BUCKLEY: Doesn't that contradict your previous analysis that the extended territories were not necessarily militarily advantageous?

MR. AVINERI: Not necessarily, but I am saying--

MR. BUCKLEY: Therefore what's the risk?

MR. AVINERI: What I say is that if extended territories aren't necessarily the best guarantee, it doesn't yet follow that less territory is the best guarantee. The question is, what happens on the other side. What I am saying is that since '67 there has been Israeli fixation on territory as the sole component of national security.

MR. BUCKLEY: And it has become fetishistic.

MR. AVINERI: It's fetishistic if you wish. And there are a number of other components. And the main one is, to me, the intention and the behavior of the other side. And because about intentions we can quarrel, and Mr. Katz and I quarrel about Sadat and his intentions, after three or five years of some sort of behavior which I hope will bear me out, we may perhaps then not be able to quarrel, because you deal then with facts.

MR. BUCKLEY: We'll make it a date here, four years from now. But let me ask Mr. Katz this. The process by which the present arrangements came into being is one whose paternal responsibility is very heavily on America. Would you concede that under the circumstances, our midwifery of these arrangements gives you more assurance than you've ever had that the United States will feel a moral responsibility to see that there is no disruption in the terms of the treaty, at least to the extent of penalizing you for not having a naval base which we were instrumental in removing? After all, we have got a lot of boats around here.

MR. KATZ: Well, on the record of the United States, I would say no. I don't know whether anybody in this country would say yes in any serious sense.

MR. AVINERI: I wouldn't.

MR. KATZ: If it were a question of perhaps some minor matter, a trade treaty, something like that, maybe. But our existence is at stake here and I wouldn't trust anybody--not because they are untrustworthy people--but I wouldn't trust anybody in the world of politics, whether it's the President of the United States or anybody else. If at a given moment I was in danger and it didn't suit him to come to my assistance, and he didn't come to my assistance-- And I think to assume, or to base an agreement on an assumption that a foreign power--

MR. BUCKLEY: I didn't ask you to base an agreement. I simply asked you whether you thought you were stronger than you were a week ago--

MR. KATZ: No.

MR. BUCKLEY: --in respect of attachments by the United States--government--

MR. KATZ: No.

MR. BUCKLEY: --to Israel.

MR. KATZ: The problem is this: we have to consider the fact--this must be our central consideration--that our enemy is not far away from us. Our enemy is here on our doorstep. It is the Arabs who will decide whether to go to war or not. They are not going to ask the President of the United States whether they should or not.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, but they will ask the Soviet Union.

MR. KATZ: They may well, I don't know. I am not prepared to swear to that. Some of them probably would, and some of them wouldn't. I think there is a general misconception in the United States, both among people who disagree with me, and people who agree with me, that the real nigger in the woodpile is the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has played a big part here, but the problem is between us and the Arabs, and this problem has been taken advantage of by the Soviet Union. That is, I think, the best way of defining it.

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Rabin said on this program yesterday that as a practical matter, if the Arabs choose to play the Soviet option, they would need Soviet material, without which they could not achieve a threatening potential. Do you disagree with that?

MR. KATZ: Some of them--with regard to some of them, that is so, sure. But after all now you have Saudi Arabia and Egypt getting arms from the West. So you can say it's 50-50. But the fact is that when they have--they have arms--and say within two or three years they will all have a certain quantity of arms--they will be able to decide on their own. They won't necessarily have to get Soviet approval for a war. I want to make this one brief point in addition, and that is about a Palestinian state. Assuming, God forbid, that a Palestinian state were to be on the table, that we had left Judea and Samaria and Gaza, there wouldn't be a Palestinian state. I don't think it would be allowed to rise by the other Arab neighbors, who would fight over the territory,

except in one circumstance, and that is if the Soviet Union put its foot down and insisted on the state being established.

MR. AVINERI: Very briefly, about the Palestinian state, there is also another possibility: that the United States will set it up. So I would suggest that we don't worry with the Soviet red flag in our face about the Palestinian state. The Palestinian West Bank state can be a creature of the United States as well as of the Soviet Union, and I think you would object to it as much then as you do now and it has nothing to do with the Soviet Union or the United States.

MR. KATZ: No, I object to it--I am just mentioning what I regard as a probable fact.

MR. AVINERI: There is another probability. You see, if there were to be a West Bank state it would not be because the Soviets are pushing it but because the United States is pushing it. And that's the present situation. But let me agree with you. Because there is one thing on which I agree with you, so let me just say it.

MR. BUCKLEY: Let's dwell on that. (laughter)

MR. AVINERI: And this is your initial question about do I feel a bit more comfortable that the United States is the guarantor--if that is the term. Surely the fact that the United States is behind the treaty gives the treaty some weight and a lot of muscle. However--

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, we're sinking four or five billion dollars into it, among other things.

MR. AVINERI: Both into Egypt and into Israel. This is certainly the only thing which facilitates the peace agreement on both sides, because both the Egyptian economy and the Israeli economy are in very bad shape, as you know, mainly because of the war effort, or the security effort. However, I think that the future of relations between us and the Arabs will not depend on the United States and will not depend on the Soviet Union. They can help, they can even subvert, as the Soviet Union has done in the past. But it will really depend on the relationship between our two peoples. And it is therefore so important that we establish a relationship of trust and cooperation between at least one major Arab country and Israel. If there is going to be peace in the Middle East it is not because of diplomatic maneuvers out of the State Department or out of the White House. They may be the handle or the instrument, but the content of the relationship between Israel and the Arab countries will be decided by the people here. If the Egyptians will find that it is to their advantage to have peace with Israel, there is going to be peace with Israel. If other Arab countries will be able to join them, if moderate Palestinians will come forward and we'll be able to negotiate with them, this will really clinch the argument and this will really be the decisive factor and therefore it is so important that in the forthcoming months this climate of trust between Israelis and Egyptians and possibly the Israelis and other Arab countries will be further developed.



MR. BUCKLEY: Do I understand you to be saying that the superpowers have certain negative, but very little positive, power?

MR. AVINERI: In a way I am saying that the superpowers can create--

MR. BUCKLEY: Can disrupt, create subversion and so on.

MR. AVINERI: They can pave the way towards peace, as President Carter has done, with some risk to his political posture, and they can pave it; they can, if you wish, oil it with money. But they cannot guarantee it. Because ultimately, as Mr. Katz says, it is the Arabs who were out to destroy us and there is going to be peace in the Middle East only if the Arab countries and the Arab leaders will accept the existence of Israel as a sovereign body politic in the Middle East. And this is what at least one Arab country appears now to have accepted.

MR. BUCKLEY: Now, to what extent is the question of east Jerusalem critical in respect of Saudi Arabia?

MR. AVINERI: I think the Saudi Arabians are much more mundane and secular people than they sometimes seem to appear in their pious moments. This piety if you wish will be very, very impressive in the West, but I think they are very businesslike people. They have their beliefs like all of us. I don't think they play any greater role in Saudi Arabia than in any other mundane country. I mean those are not holy, holy men out of the desert. Those are very tough negotiators who hold the pursestrings of the world in their pocket. So they know what they are doing. On the issue of Jerusalem--it's the toughest of all issues. And therefore, under any circumstances, I would suggest that we leave it until the last. Because if you want to break up any agreement, you start--

MR. BUCKLEY: Just mention Jerusalem.

MR. AVINERI: Yes, just mention Jerusalem. It's just like the issue of Berlin between the two Germanies. Here we have witnessed 15 years of normalization between the two German states without the issue of Berlin really having been tackled. It's still hanging up in the air, and if you wish, it's as central to the German national consciousness as Jerusalem is to Jews and to Moslems and to Christians and to Arabs. And therefore, perhaps if we manage to solve the other problems, as we now appear to solve the problem with Egypt, as we now appear to find a formula that will enable both Israeli security on the West Bank and autonomy and eventually self-determination for the Palestinians, as I hope we will be able to solve the problem with the Syrians one day. I don't know on which basis, but I hope it is conceivable. Then perhaps we may find out that the issue of Jerusalem isn't that important--because it is that important because we disagree. Once we agree about other things, perhaps we will be able to live with some of the contradictions which are in the Jerusalem situation, which we'll probably have to mend for a very long time.

MR. BUCKLEY: Let me ask you a question to which I don't know the answer. Is there less dissatisfaction or more dissatisfaction among the Arabs who live in east Jerusalem than there was when

we spoke four years ago? That is to say, is there a *modus vivendi* which is organically satisfying?

MR. AVINERI: I think I don't want to be a spokesman on their behalf, and I know that if an Israeli tries to assess a situation in an Arab community, he has his biases. And I have my biases as an Israeli. It's natural. I think that on the day to day level, there is a *modus vivendi*. You have seen Jerusalem. Jerusalem is an open city. The odd bomb does explode occasionally but the daily life of the city goes on. But on a deeper level, on the level of real social integration--do you meet many Arabs? How many Arabs do you have as friends? How many Jews do Arabs have as friends? We still live as two societies apart, and this is because I think in terms of the real political situation, there hasn't been much change since we last talked four years ago.

MR. KATZ: I'd like to add something about this question of Jerusalem. As we are not actually negotiating a treaty, I don't think we have to leave it to the last, until four years' time or whenever. Your point about Saudi Arabia reflects one of the really interesting myths of the period, that somehow Jerusalem is of special importance to the Saudi Arabians. This is absurd. The holy cities of Arabia are in Saudi Arabia. Jerusalem as a city was never a holy city for the Arabs.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, you are making an interesting historical point, but that is important to somebody who says it is important to him, and the Saudis have been very consistent on the Jerusalem issue.

MR. KATZ: Except during the period when Jerusalem was in Arab hands. When eastern Jerusalem was in the control of Jordan, the Saudi Arabian royal family, the king of Saudi Arabia--who, according to the present myth can't sleep at nights because he can't get to see Jerusalem--didn't ever once visit Jerusalem for 19 years. This is a part of the hoax which Arab propaganda has built up. The fact that he says that it is important to him does not nullify, as my second point of fact, that it is of paramount importance to us, because we have a history of--

MR. BUCKLEY: You are making a lawyer's point. I care very much for instance about the integrity of the Vatican, but I don't feel any compulsion to visit it regularly.

MR. KATZ: This is what they've said. I am now quoting them. I am quoting them.

MR. BUCKLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Katz; thank you very much, Professor Avineri; thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.